# INCIDENT REPORT: GSD NPM Supply Chain Hijack & Staging Environment Exposure **Document ID:** APD-SEC-2026-0522 **Date:** May 22, 2026 **Author:** Lead Devops Security Team, Aetheris Plasma Dynamics (APD) **Status:** CRITICAL - SYSTEM AUDIT IN PROGRESS --- ### Executive Summary Between January and May 2026, APD systems engineering teams heavily adopted the popular **Get Shit Done (GSD)** CLI meta-prompting utility (originally created by GitHub user `glittercowboy` / developer L. Christopherson) to accelerate our software-defined networking templates for Project Selene. Following the sudden collapse of the companion $GSD token on Bags.fm and the subsequent wiping of L. Christopherson’s social channels, security researchers identified a severe supply chain compromise. The original `glittercowboy` GitHub repository and associated NPM registry tokens were hijacked. Malicious payloads were distributed to extract developer env files, SSH configurations, and Cloudflare deployment variables. This report documents our team's attempt to isolate the compromise on our staging network (`aetheris-plasma-staging.workers.dev`) and the subsequent realization that our mitigation efforts were bypassed because an active credential-harvester had already exfiltrated our root Cloudflare deployer keys. --- ### Timeline of the Compromise (May 2026) * **May 12, 2026:** APD engineers note unusual CPU spikes on the `/debian-13-svc/` build daemon during automated GSD context builds. * **May 15, 2026:** Security bulletins confirm the `glittercowboy` repository on GitHub has been compromised. Attackers hijacked the Personal Access Tokens (PATs) and pushed a Trojan update via NPM. * **May 16, 2026:** In response, APD engineers spin up a temporary, isolated Cloudflare Worker (`aetheris-plasma-staging.workers.dev`) to audit our systems and construct a "Zero-Trust" testing sandbox. * **May 18, 2026 (The Mistake):** An engineer logs into the staging dashboard to configure API access. To automate the migration, they use a cached build utility on an un-sandboxed machine. Unknown to them, this machine had already run the compromised GSD package. * **May 19, 2026 (Exfiltration Event):** The compromised GSD package successfully scrapes the freshly generated Cloudflare Staging Deployer API Token and exports it to a remote, attacker-controlled command-and-control node. --- ### Problem & Solution Statement #### The Problem: Our developers utilized GSD in an un-sandboxed environment. Because GSD has native access to directory structures and CLI terminal outputs to perform its "agentic tasks," it was trivial for the malicious dependency update to read system memory, harvest our active Cloudflare deployment environment files, and compromise our primary staging domain configuration. ``` [Un-sandboxed Dev Machine] ---> [Malicious GSD NPM Update] │ ▼ (Scrapes Memory) [Leaked Cloudflare API Token] ---> [Attacker Node] ``` #### The Mitigation Plan (Post-Breach Attempt): 1. **Cryptographic Erasure:** Instantly run a zero-overwrite scrub on all active `./untrusted_output/` directories. 2. **Sandbox Isolation:** Transition all future agentic testing to a custom, KVM-enforced **Firecracker microVM** environment coupled with rootless Podman containers to block network exfiltration vectors completely. 3. **Revocation:** Invalidate the leaked Cloudflare Staging Deployer Token immediately (Pending coordination with regional network admins).